1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	Larry A. Hammond, 004049 Anne M. Chapman, 025965 OSBORN MALEDON, P.A. 2929 N. Central Avenue, 21st Floor Phoenix, Arizona 85012-2793 (602) 640-9000 lhammond@omlaw.com achapman@omlaw.com John M. Sears, 005617 P.O. Box 4080 Prescott, Arizona 86302 (928) 778-5208 John.Sears@azbar.org	SUPERIOR COURT YAVAFAL COUNTY, ARIZONA 2010 JUL 15 PM 4: 41 JEANNE HICKS, CLERK BY: Clerk
11	Attorneys for Defendant	
12	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF YAVAPAI	
13 14	STATE OF ARIZONA,) No. P1300CR20081339
15	Plaintiff,) Div. 6
16 17 18 19 20	vs. STEVEN CARROLL DEMOCKER, Defendant.	DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM ON ARIZONA RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 19.5 OUTPOS
21) UNDER SEAL
22 23 24 25	Steven DeMocker, by and through counsel, hereby files a preliminary position on whether or not resumption of the trial will result in prejudice to the defense. This position is based on the due process clause, the Sixth Amendment, the Eighth Amendment and Arizona counterparts, Arizona Rules of Evidence, Rules of	
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DIVISION 6

Professional Conduct, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure and the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

Mr. DeMocker was indicted in October of 2008. The parties engaged in extensive pretrial litigation which resulted in a series of pretrial rulings, preclusion and sanctions against the State. Trial commenced with jury selection on May 4, 2010. Judge Lindberg fell ill suddenly on June 17, 2010. Judge Darrow was appointed to make a Rule 19.5 determination on July 2, 2010. A hearing is set on July 16 to address this issue and the Court has suggested that trial might resume on Tuesday, July 20.

The determination under 19.5 is for the Court to make. The Rule does not call for counsel's recommendations, although the Court has requested that any position from either side be provided to the Court. Defense counsel appreciate the daunting task undertaken by the Court of getting up to speed on a case that has been pending for nearly two years with a trial that began on May 4. Counsel also understand that the determination required under Rule 19.5 of whether or not the resumption of trial would be prejudicial to either the State or the defendant is a difficult one to make.

I. The Length of the Delay in Resuming Trial Was Intentionally Caused by the State

Since Judge Lindberg's illness on June 17, the State has done everything in its power to delay the resumption of this trial with this jury and create a mistrial. First, the State rejected thirteen of eighteen proposed judges and proposed no judges themselves to resume the trial. Without doubt, the lack of active cooperation contributed to the delay. Second, the State, even though it was aware of the facts as stated in John Sears' opening on June 3, waited until July 1 to inform the Court and parties, in violation of Rule 15.6, that it had additional disclosure. Third, the State disclosed over 1100 pages

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of late disclosure, the discovery of which was only delayed by the State's lack of due diligence, the materials now produced have been available to the State since 2008. Fourth, the State late disclosed, on July 9, that it intended to call John Sears as a witness as to the Hartford Insurance issues. Fifth, the State improperly inquired as to the substance of ex parte under seal orders of the Court and appears to have obtained significant otherwise sealed information. Sixth, the State, after 7 days of presenting its case-in-chief, announced for the first time that it would need 25 days to complete its case-in-chief, creating a trial two months longer than proposed during voir dire and through and including the first 8 days of trial. Then, on July 12, the State filed a Motion to Determine Counsel, ignoring the Court's order to file its position on the Hartford Insurance issues, and made wild, unsupported and defamatory accusations against counsel. This pattern of misconduct can only be seen as a series of attempts to interfere with Mr. DeMocker's right to counsel of his choice and to create a mistrial. This delay could have been limited to a matter of a week or two with the full cooperation of the State. Instead, the delay is now more than a month. This is the direct result of the State's misconduct.

II. The Defense Position on Whether or Not the Resumption of Trial Would be Prejudicial Will Be Informed by Resolution of Pending Issues

The defense position with respect to whether or not the resumption of trial would be prejudicial to Mr. DeMocker will be informed largely by a few outstanding issues.

1. Motions to Reconsider

The question of whether or not the Court reconsiders Judge Lindberg's evidentiary rulings and makes contrary evidentiary decisions will have a substantial effect on the defense thinking about prejudice of this month long delay. Although the State has yet to file a singe motion to reconsider, it has several times mentioned since June 17 that it intends to do so. Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 16.1(d) provides as follows:

Finality of Pretrial Determination. Except for good cause, or as otherwise provided by these rules, an issue previously determined by the court shall not be reconsidered.

The comment to Rule 16.1(d) further explains: "issues, once determined by a court ought not, without a showing of good cause, be reconsidered by the same court or another of equal jurisdiction."

Counsel and the Court spent a great deal of time and energy identifying and litigating important pretrial evidentiary concerns over a year and a half. The Court issued detailed Minute Entries with respect to many evidentiary issues. The defense has provided the Court with an outline of evidentiary rulings and copies of relevant transcripts and Minute Entries. The defense has made strategic decisions with respect to opening statements, cross examination, and the identification of witnesses and exhibits based on these pretrial decisions of the Court. If those decisions are going to be reconsidered and evidentiary rulings are going to be different mid-trial, prejudice will result. This is precisely the reason that evidentiary motions are contemplated by Rule 16.1 to be filed not later than 20 days prior to trial and that pretrial determinations are to be treated as final "except for good cause."

Because of the inherent prejudice of changing evidentiary decisions mid-trial and the State's repeated suggestions that they intend to ask the Court to reconsider a variety of evidentiary rulings, counsel suggest that this issue must be addressed before the defense can provide its position on the prejudice of resuming trial. Therefore, counsel request that the Court order the State to identify all evidentiary rulings it intends to seek reconsideration of by 5:00 on Friday, July 16. Counsel also request that the State file any motions and briefing in support of any such motions to reconsider prior evidentiary rulings by 9:00 Monday, July 19. Counsel further request that the Court hold a hearing on Monday at 3:00 p.m. for the defense to be heard on the possibility of motions for

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reconsideration and resulting prejudice. This process will assist in the defense determination of whether or not the delay occasioned by Judge Lindberg's illness and the State's misconduct is prejudicial and whether the trial should now proceed.

2. Hartford Insurance Issues

As mentioned elsewhere in pleadings filed with the Court, the very serious and entirely unwarranted attacks on the defense team by the prosecution during this break have certainly prejudiced Mr. DeMocker.

The continued prejudice and defense position regarding Rule 19.5 will also be very much informed by the Court's decision concerning the admissibility of the late disclosed Hartford Insurance proceeds evidence. If the State is told firmly that their proposed evidence related to the disposition of the life insurance proceeds will not be admitted, the defense believes it is much more likely that the trial can proceed without continued prejudice to Mr. DeMocker.

Ш. The Hobson's Choice

Mr. DeMocker has been incarcerated since October of 2008. He has always and continues to maintain his innocence. He very much wants to proceed with trial as soon as possible so that he can be acquitted and return to his family. He and his family, particularly his daughters who are the most direct victims of the murder of Carol Kennedy, have been denied their right to grieve and comfort one another in their great loss. Although Mr. DeMocker has obviously been prejudiced by the State's conduct in lengthening this delay, providing late disclosure and accusing his counsel of misconduct, the failure to resume this trial and requiring the trial to resume with a different jury at a later time would result in even greater prejudice and delay to Mr. DeMocker's eventual exoneration and release. Mr. DeMocker should never have had to consider making this choice.

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1 The defense believes that answers to these pending questions identified above would 2 assist in their determination of the prejudice to Mr. DeMocker in continuing with this 3 trial with this jury. Counsel request an opportunity to be heard on this issue after these 4 questions are resolved. 5 DATED this 15th day of July, 2010. 6 7 8 By: John M. Sears 9 P.O. Box 4080 Prescott, Arizona 86302 10 OSBORN MALEDON, P.A. 11 Larry A. Hammond 12 Anne M. Chapman 2929 N. Central Avenue, Suite 2100 13 Phoenix, Arizona 85012-2793 14 Attorneys for Defendant 15 16 **ORIGINAL** of the foregoing hand delivered for filing this 15th day of July, 2010, with: 17 18 Jeanne Hicks 19 Clerk of the Court Yavapai County Superior Court 20 120 S. Cortez Prescott, AZ 86303 21 22 **COPIES** of the foregoing hand delivered this 23 this 15th day of July, 2010, to: 24 The Hon. Warren R. Darrow 25 Judge Pro Tem B 120 S. Cortez 26

Prescott, AZ 86303

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Joseph C. Butner, Esq. Jeffrey Paupore, Esq.

Prescott Courthouse basket